What is a
failed
state?
The debate
of state capabilities centres on two different approaches: i) scholars who want
to operationalise the notion and ii) scholars who avoid the notion altogether
because of conceptual flaws. The former approach attempts to predict breeding
grounds of future crises, while the latter approach is afraid that the
indiscriminate pooling together of states undermines this very attempt. This is
a problem because unique differences, holding crucial information for
decision-makers in the international community, will be obscured by a
quasi-scientific approach.
The
Foreign Policy
journal (FP) creates an annually published
Failed
State Index
(FSI) based on twelve equally weighted criteria (Beehner, 2012)
– including variables such as demographic pressures, economic decline, security
apparatus and external factionalized elites, to name but a few –. The FSI
appears scientific to the layman with its continuous listing of countries and
its weighted matrix but it fails to ensure validity because of its lack to provide
predictability, an intrinsic problem in the research of failed states. Beehner
shows, for example, that Libya, being a borderline country ranking 111
th
out of 177 in 2011 (FP, 2011), was a critical country, ranking 50
th
just a year later (FP, 2012).
Even if
states are continuously ranked against each other, the FSI fails to account for
their differences because it focuses on the dichotomy between failed and
non-failed states rather than intrinsic problems within each country. As such,
it fails to predict changes throughout time and only serves as a snapshot of a
given year. Another danger of the concept of “failed states” is that it could
become a Trojan horse for international interventionists. Given the dichotomy
between failed and non-failed states, the international community, if it so
wishes, can find support for it in the United Nations Security Council, could
declare a “failed” state incapable of its responsibility to protect its
citizens, which can ultimately lead to an intervention to restore these
capacities (Call, 2011, p. 304). This is not just a theoretical fear but can be
seen for example with Resolution 1970 and 1973 in Libya.
The second approach discards the notion of failed state, not only at the level
of operationalization but also at the level of conceptualisation. It attempts
to replace the notion of ‘failed state’ with more vague terms such as
disintegration
or
collapse
(Thürer, 1999). The problem with the terminology of failed
states, for them, is that the word ‘failed’ describes an outcome rather than a
process. At the point of having failed, the problem is that there is little to
nothing the international community is able to do to avert severe problems. The
merit of the second approach is that they allow for a broader assessment of the
actual ailments of a specific country. Thürer (1999) emphasises endogenous
factors, claiming that societies in such countries are more likely to turn
against themselves rather than against neighbouring countries. Ultimately, the
terminology of the second approach implies at least some minor form of
capabilities remaining and as such, warrants more respect towards the ailing
state than the first approach would do.
Given the lack of validity, the fact that the FSI is but a snapshot in time and
the potential interventionist nature of the notion failed state, it is sound to
rethink the notion of failed state. Charles T. Call has done so and
conceptualised states as ‘weak’ states – note the resemblance to the attempt of
the second approach to avoid categorical terminology – if they emulate any or
all of the following three gaps:
-
The
capacity gap
(2011, p. 306): The state is unable to
provide minimal public goods and services. Call concedes however that this
gap is very difficult to measure because the concept depends on several
subjective definitions.
-
The
security gap
(2011, p. 307): The state is unable to
provide sufficient security for its citizens, both internally and
externally.
-
The
legitimacy gap
(2011, p. 308): Call refers here to the
internal lack of legitimacy rather than to the external legitimacy, which
is given to some autocratic ruling elites due to the upkeep of negative
liberty. Georg Sørensen (2007, p. 364) calls the latter a “certified life
insurance” by the UN Convention.
Having
examined the conceptual flaws of the notion failed state, this notion of weak
state seems to be a compromise between the first and second approach in the
debate. It incorporates an analysis of state failure but this analysis is more
continuous and thus allows a more nuanced examination of the underlying
problems of a country. The next section will use Call’s approach to assess the
situation in Afghanistan now and over time.
Is Afghanistan a
weak state?
Having laid
out the analytical framework in order to assess whether a state has failed or
not and having substituted this terminology by Call’s notion of weak state, we
can now assess how this applies in practice. Call (2011, p. 310) believes
Afghanistan to emulate all of these three gaps but he lacks a thorough analysis
to show how much this is the case. To fill the void, I will use Ahmed Rashid’s
historical account of Afghanistan in order to give us a better understanding of
the broader picture, which will help us later to distinguish between short-term
and long-term deficiencies within each of the gaps.
Based on
Rashid (2008, pp. 8-12),
we can divide
Afghanistan’s history into three parts: i) a communist coup in 1973 removing
the 200-year old Durrani dynasty; ii) the Soviet Union (SU) overthrowing the
Afghani communist party in 1979, triggering the funding of counter-insurgency
forces by Western states – in particular by the United States of America (USA)
– via their regional ally in Pakistan; iii) the SU’s withdrawal in 1989,
triggering the Western states to stop their
support, leading to a power vacuum and paving the way to civil war in January
1993.
According to both Carlo Ungaro (2012) and Rashid (2008, p. 12), the Cold War
has been the crucial period of time in the erosion and destruction of
Afghanistan, both economically and societally. For Rashid (2008, p. 8), the
dependency of Afghanistan on the two big blocs during the Cold War is the
reason as to why “even today [Afghanistan] cannot raise sufficient revenue to
pay for the necessary elements of a modern state”. Coups, invasions,
counter-coups and civil war did not just open a security gap but also primed
the Afghani economy towards the perpetuation of violence over time. Thürer
(1999) rightly blames this time and the international community to be
co-responsible for the state’s collapse; in Afghanistan’s case the funds by
either the SU or the USA helped to prolong fighting and exacerbated the
fractionalization of the society.
Following
the Cold War, Afghanistan plunged into a civil war, which could be a sign of
the legitimacy gap because there were different factions fighting against each
other. Only the emergence of the Taliban closed this gap, with high hopes that
stability and prosperity would be restored (Rashid, 2008, p. 13). Indeed, the
power vacuum and thus the security gap were closed by the accession of the
Taliban. Yet, the Afghani people were soon disillusioned by the closeness of
their once praised Taliban with Pakistan and Osama bin Laden (Rashid, 2008, p.
13). The Taliban no longer responded to the needs of the people but to Islamic
principles and their supporting allies abroad. This shows that already under
the Taliban rule of Afghanistan, there has been a widening legitimacy gap again
because institutions were designed according to the Taliban and not according
to the people’s will. Additionally, the then leader Mullah Omar saw one of the
most severe period of droughts and starvation, an increase in the number of refugees
and internally displaced people and an economic and societal backlash to the
ban on opium (Rashid, 2008, p. 19). The droughts alone, for example, have
forced “more than 1 million Afghani [to flee] to neighbouring Pakistan” (PBS,
2011). A clear sign of the capacity gap because he was not able to provide for
the Afghani people or even worse did not care to care for them.
Externally,
the establishment of al Qaeda and the global jihad ideology – all inspired by
Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan – spawned a new interest of the West towards
Afghanistan. Their pressure on the Taliban culminated in resolution 1267 in
1999 – which demanded the handing over of bin Laden – and in resolution 1333 in
2000 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – which led to an arms
embargo and the freezing of certain assets abroad – both being defied by the
Taliban (Rashid, 2008, pp. 15-18).
Having
finished my historical account, let us now turn to each of the gaps in turn in
order to see how Afghani institutions fail to fill them. The
capacity gap’s
origin
might be situated in the time of the civil war, during which the provision
of public goods and services came to a halt. It seems however, that the Taliban
was able to provide these services but willingly cut their provision, while
aggrandising their power and grip over Afghanistan (Hehir, 2007, p. 319). This
is a qualification to Call’s definition in the sense that state weakness might
not only be a consequence of incompetent governments but also a consequence of
deliberate withholding of services and support. The gap’s current acuteness is
manifested by the annual
Human Development Report
(HDR), which attempts
to measure the gap by evaluating a countries data about health, education and
living standards (2013a), which puts Afghanistan 172
nd
out of 187 in
their report for 2012 (2013b). In particular the current incompetence to
provide adequate health care is a striking example of the capacity gap (Rashid,
2008, pp. 330-1). Afghanistan has no adequate health care and is dependent on
ambulances provided by national armies or non-governmental organisations. The
threat is that the increasing spread of diseases such as HIV/AIDS (Rashid,
2008) could also further increase the capacity gap because they are diseases
which bear a double-cost: i) the cost for the sick and the health care system
and ii) the cost for the economy of losing the productivity of a healthy man.
Additionally, the HDR shows that the educational sector is still failing to
provide the most basic education to the Afghani people. This means that most of
the citizens continue to be ill-skilled for the jobs needed to close the
capacity gap.
The
security gap
seems to be the only one which had been permanently
filled during the Taliban reign. Yet, it is questionable as to whether the
aggrandisement of power and the arbitrary use thereof can be seen as the kind
of security Call has in mind. It has rather become a relative good for those
submissive enough to the sharia law and reign of the Taliban, while defiant
citizens had to fear that their security would be revoked. Instead of
attenuating the historical division of the Afghani people, the USA exacerbated
the security problem after having invaded Afghanistan in 2001 by funding
different regional warlords to help them in their fight against the Taliban
(Rashid, 2008, p. 131). Another mistake seems to be the ban of opium, which has
led to a further empowerment of warlords who were able to exploit the
vulnerability of farmers (Rashid, 2008, p. 323). Eventually, it also offered
the Taliban an opportunity to regain power and re-establish them after the
American-led invasion, as there was no coherent security strategy (Brown, 2012,
p. 139). The security gap still exists because Afghanistan cannot levy
sufficient funds to finance a sufficient security force. The issue is though
that the situation has deteriorated in recent years with more people feeling
unsafe in their communities (Bajoria, 2011, p. 2) and with “2013 [probably
being] the most violent year since 2001”, with almost all indexes of violence
increasing in relation to 2012 (ECOI 2014).
Let us lastly examine the
legitimacy gap
. I mentioned before the Afghani
dissatisfaction with the Taliban over their closeness to Pakistan and Bin
Laden. Yet, there are more recent signs of a worrying legitimacy gap for the
current democratically elected government. One of these signs is the
Constitutional Loyal Jirga (CLJ), which was heralded as a new beginning after
the International Security Assistance Force’s intervention against Taliban rule
in 2001 but soon resulted in the opposite (Rashid, 2008, p. 217). It added to
the disillusionment of the people towards the government but also towards their
respective tribe leaders who could not overcome fractionalization and rather
followed tribal and personal incentives over national ones. The funding of
warlords by the USA is another sign of a legitimacy gap, as conflicting signals
are sent. On the one hand the USA seems to support the government but on the
other hand it does not deem the government fit enough to address the security
gap and thus funds regional warlords. This erodes the support for both the
government which is seen as weak, as well as for the USA. In particular the US
intervention with the CLJ (Rashid, 2008, p. 140) and the dependence of Afghani
re-building on the USA (Rashid, 2008, pp. 136-7) makes the government look weak
and dependent, eroding its legitimacy. We can see that there is a historical
dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the government – in particular because
the people were not able to choose their own destiny for so long – but the
recent trend is not helping but rather exacerbating these feelings. It remains
to be seen as to whether the elections scheduled for 2014 will be able to start
filling the gap again or whether potential irregularities deteriorate the
situation even further.
From the above analysis, it seems that the fact that Afghanistan cannot raise
sufficient revenues is cynically the underlying problem for all of the three
gaps. It makes Afghanistan dependent on international donors, which makes it
look weak, which makes international donors look for military support in
regional warlords, which erodes the Afghani legitimacy, which might have a
negative impact on the effectiveness of infrastructural projects to close the
capacity gap, which means that Afghanistan continues to need money from
international donors. It is a vicious circle, which is hard to break through
for Afghanistan.
Table
1
Summary of the deficiencies of Afghanistan in respect to
Call’s three gaps of weak states
Deficiencies
|
|
Capacity
Gap
|
•
Civil
war brought supply of minimal services to a halt
•
Strong
Taliban unwilling to provide them once in power
|
Security
Gap
|
•
Mentality
of distinction following fragmentation of society
•
Taliban
exploited post-invasion negligence of NATO and reconquered parts of
Afghanistan, threatening the new order
•
Militarisation
of society; funding of competing militia and warlords
|
Legitimacy
Gap
|
•
Disillusionment
with proxy-status of Taliban to Pakistan
•
Disillusionment
with influence of Bin Laden and al Qaeda
•
Disillusionment
with leaders of tribes and government regarding CLJ
•
Economic
situation seems inevitably bad
|
Table 1 summarises
the deficiencies of Afghanistan in respect to the gap they belong to.
Afghanistan is a weak state because it shows strong signs of all three gaps.
Nevertheless, there are also some successes achieved by the Afghani people,
their government and the international community such as higher school enrolment,
the return of refugees or the spread of media (Rashid, 2008, pp. 183-4), which
gives hope about Afghanistan’s future potential.
Conclusion
Afghanistan
has not failed but it has severe problems. It emulates all three of Call’s gaps
and thus can be called a weak state. The underlying problem seems to be the
fragmentised security and the lack of funds to close any of the gaps.
Afghanistan is dependent on the international community but there is also
enough evidence to claim that it is the international community which is
responsible for the current situation – at least historically –. The problem
about the discussion of whether a state has failed, collapsed, disintegrated or
as to whether it is weak, is that it does not give us enough answers of what to
do next. While we could say that decision-makers just need to focus on closing
the gaps, we do not know which comes first, second and last. What is more
important for the Afghani at the moment? Is it a well-functioning security
apparatus and thus the end of fear of constant attacks? Or is it maybe a
revival of the economy, which would allow the unemployment rate to drop? Having
analysed Afghanistan to be weak, these questions need to be answered in a
future paper in order to not just give an account of the present but to also
give a strategy about the future.
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Copyright
statement
©
Benjamin Gaiser. This
article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Licence (CC BY).