TY - JOUR AB - <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 6pt -2.3pt 6pt 0cm; line-height: 22px; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color: rgb(0, 0, 0); text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Sylfaen, serif;">Modern statehood has shown that the military is too much of an important factor to be ignored in the formation of foreign or even domestic policies. There are times when circumstances align in a way which increases the chances of intervention, for instance, weak government, increased popularity of the military, or development of any other formidable motives. This article, however, analyzes how budgetary assignments affect the intention of the military to intervene and what the magnitude of its effect is upon democratization. The argument is based around two theories, one which states that increases in military resources will make it one less enemy for a government that is starting to democratize. A stronger military will be able to protect the government from unwanted turbulence and a larger piece of the budget is more likely to keep it busy figuring out workings of advanced weaponry. The second theory is the opposite. It is based around two contentions, one of which concerns leaving more budget to democratic social programs, while the other states that a weaker military will not be prepared for a coup. Using simple OLS, theories were tested regressing Polity Combined – a variable that records various government qualities on a 20 point scale – against military budget as a percentage of GDP. Resulting cross-national analysis of 115 countries provides support for the second theory: governments that generally spend less on their military are usually more democratic.<o:p></o:p></span></p> AU - Gediminas Blazys DA - 2012/10// DO - 10.5526/esj91 IS - 1 VL - 5 PB - University of Essex Library Services PY - 2012 TI - On the Road to Democracy with Sticks and Carrots. The Relationship between Military Funding and Democratization. T2 - Essex Student Journal UR - http://publications.essex.ac.uk/esj/article/id/140/ ER -